|
MARISS services are being financed by ESA the framework of the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) Initiative. At a general level, GMES is intended to respond to European requirements for information to support environment and security policies in areas such as:
- European commitments for monitoring the global environment
- Environmental policies with a European geographic focus (eg biodiversity, marine environment protection)
- European civil protection
- Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policies
- EU External Aid, Development and Security Policies
- The Lisbon Strategy
Information is to be provided by combining data from Earth Observation systems, in-situ monitoring networks, interoperable standards and data access mechanisms and state of the art analysis, fusion, assimilation and forecasting models.
MARISS as a Response to European Policies
MARISS is intended to promote the integration of satellite based maritime surveillance and coastal monitoring in the framework of the following policy sectors:
The European Integrated Maritime Policy
In the area of maritime surveillance, the policy communication noted that surveillance activities in the areas of fisheries, the environment, policing of the seas or immigration fall under the responsibility of several different enforcement agencies operating independently from each other. This often results in sub-optimal use of scarce resources.
In response and as part of the proposed integrated policy, the European Commission, advocates the need for a higher degree of coordination on maritime surveillance through deeper cooperation within and among the Member States' coastguards and other appropriate agencies. It is expected that the gradual achievement of an integrated network of vessel tracking and e-navigation systems for European coastal waters and the high seas, including satellite monitoring and long range identification and tracking (LRIT), would also provide an invaluable tool to public agencies.
Member States' coastguards and other appropriate agencies. It is expected that the gradual achievement of an integrated network of vessel tracking and e-navigation systems for European coastal waters and the high seas, including satellite monitoring and long range identification and tracking (LRIT), would also provide an invaluable tool to public agencies
The EuroSur Initiative and European Integrated Border Management(1987)
Since the Tampere Programme of 1999, the management of the external borders has been one of the cornerstones of the progressive establishment of the European Union as an area of freedom, security and justice. The Commission's Communication "Towards integrated management of the external borders of the Member States of the European Union" set out priorities for the development of integrated management of the external borders, focusing on a common body of legislation, operational cooperation between Member States and solidarity between Member States and the Community.
As part of the measures responding to this programme and in response to a request from the European Council, member states and FRONTEX have been working to evaluate the feasibility and define an implementation approach for an integrated system to improve further the surveillance of the southern maritime external borders. This proposed that a common European Surveillance System for Borders (EUROSUR) should be created following the recommendations of the "BORTEC" feasibility study presented by FRONTEX in late 2006.
It is proposed that EUROSUR could in a first stage focus on synergies created by linking the existing national surveillance systems currently in use at the southern maritime external borders. In a second stage, however, it should gradually replace national surveillance systems at land and maritime borders, providing a cost-efficient solution, including e. g. a combination of radar and satellite surveillance at European level, taking into account on-going developments realised in the framework of GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security).
This European Border Surveillance System EUROSUR - should support the Member States in reaching full situational awareness on the situation at their external borders and increase the reaction capabilityof their law enforcement authorities.
It is proposed that such a framework should be set up without affecting the respective areas of jurisdiction of Member States nor harmonising or replacing any existing systems. In addition, the interlinking of different systems must pay attention to geographical circumstances and differences between types of borders, in particular between land and maritime borders.
It is proposed to implement EUROSUR in three phases, which with the exception of the third phase which would be built upon the first two phases would be carried out in parallel:
- PHASE 1: Upgrading and extending national surveillance systems and interlinking national infrastructures in a communication network.
- PHASE 2: Targeting research and development to improve the performance of surveillance tools and sensors (e.g. satellites, UAVs, etc.), and developing a common application of surveillance tools, including the development of a pre-frontier intelligence picture.
- PHASE 3: All relevant data from national surveillance, new surveillance tools, European and international reporting systems (AIS, LRIT, VMS, etc.) and intelligence sources should be gathered, analysed and disseminated in a structured manner, to create a common information sharing environment.
The Maritime Dimension of the European Security and Defence Policy and the MARSUR working group
The sea has already been used for terror attacks by boats armed with rockets and small arms, water borne improvised explosive devices and as an enabler for terrorist attacks. It is conceivable that a renegade ship such as an LNG carrier could even be employed as a weapon near a centre of population. Continued use of the sea for logistic support to terrorism through the movement of arms, personnel or funds is substantiated by evidence. The maritime environment provides a potential conduit for CBRN material, both for the small high technology items, but also for larger items associated with weapon delivery. Other threats include cross-border illegal migration, which is forecast to increase significantly, and criminal activity including narcotics, human trafficking and piracy, all of which is increasing in sophistication and volume. These factors impact Europe s physical and economic security either directly or indirectly.
In the European theatre of operations, nations are conducting Maritime Security Operations today as part of routine, peacetime duties in response to the threats mentioned above. Traditionally referred to as Constabulary tasks, these operations are generally either conducted independently by member states navies and/or civilian maritime agencies in order to enforce legal powers and safeguard sovereignty or as part of multi-national military operations, which aim to safeguard common defence and security interests. In addition, there are a plethora of military and civilian initiatives at various stages of maturity which are seeking to enhance maritime domain awareness in parts of Europe.
Most, if not all, of these initiatives overlap in terms of the effect they are wishing to achieve. It is axiomatic that by avoiding duplication, a more holistic approach would make better use of available resources. Currently, there is no overarching framework to bring European civilian and military elements together in order to address threats efficiently, coherently and collectively.
The Chiefs of European Navies (CHENs) propose that A European inter-agency approach to Maritime Security Operations would better safeguard common prosperity and security interests by protecting and supporting legitimate activities while countering the threat of current and emerging terrorist, hostile, illegal or dangerous acts within the maritime domain. By ensuring freedom of navigation and commerce, it would also promote regional, and contribute to global, economic stability and protect maritime trade as the heart of the regional and global economy.
Six strategic actions are identified as necessary to achieve synergy of civilian and military maritime security activities in a co-ordinated effort to address all maritime threats. These include the need to maximize maritime domain awareness. There are numerous ongoing initiatives, both civilian and military, within Europe which aim to create a comprehensive maritime surveillance capability and to share information. A strongly favoured near term approach for multinational co-operation on maritime domain awareness is to create a simple, unclassified picture of maritime activity based on information easily accessible and disseminated through IMO standards such as among others, the Automated Identification System (AIS).
In parallel, Working Group 1 of the PT MARSUR gathering over 16 participating Member States (pMS), is currently working on the definition of a Common Staff Target (CST) to express the military operational capability needs for increased information exchanges between the pMS in support of their maritime surveillance tasks, taking into account an inter-pillar approach. This Working Group is coordinated by the European Defence Agency and chaired by the Finnish Navy. It considers a range of surveillance and data gathering platforms and assets including satellite based methods.
|